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By Letter of 28 March 1983 the Committee on Budgetary Control 
requested authorization to draw up a report on clearance of the accounts 
of the EAGGF Guarantee section following the Court of Auditors report 
<OJ No. c 313 of 29.11.82>. 
Authorization was given by the Bureau of the European Parliament 
on 13 March 1983. 
On 3 November 1983 the Committee on Budgetary Control appointed 
Mr Key rapporteur. 
It considered the draft report dt its meeting of 19 March 1Y81+ ami 
unanimously adopted the motion for a resolution and the explanatory state-
ment at that meeting. 
Present: Mr AIGNER, chairman; Mrs BOSERUP and Mr PRICE, vice-chairmen; 
Mr GABERT (deputizing for Mr KEY, rapporteur); Mr ANSQUER, Mr BATTERSBY, 
Mr FRUH, Mr GOERENS (deputizing for Mr JURGENS), Mr IRMER, Mr MART, 
Mr NOTENBOOM. 
The deadline for the tabling of amendments to this report appears in 
the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated. 
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A 
The Committee on Budgetary Control hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on clearance of the accounts of the EAGGF Guarantee section 
A. aware of the fact that expenditure on the EAGGF Guarantee section constitutes 
more than half of the whole budget of the Community, 
B. noting that the Commission advances appropriations to Member States who 
undertake the disbursement of these funds, and that the Commission has 
ultimately to clear Member States' account of EAGGF Guarantee section spending, 
C. bearing in mind that the Commission each year refuses to accept certain 
expenditure as justified, 
D. aware particularly of the fact that delays which can amount to four years 
or more have built up in clearing Member States' accounts, 
E. anxious lest these delays in clearance should diminish the effectiveness of 
the discharge decision, 
f. having regard to the special report of the Court of Auditors concerning 
clearance of the accounts of the EAGGF Guarantee section,1 
G. having regard to the report by the Court of Auditors in response to the 
conclusions of the European Council of 18 June 1983, 2 
H. having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control <Doe. 1-77/84>, 
1. Underlines that the ultimate responsibility tor administering the EAGGF 
Guarantee section lies with the Commission, whilst recognising that the scale of 
the policy necessitates a decentralised management with the full cooperation and 
assistance of the Member States which also results in economies in the administration 
of the appropriations; 
1 
2 OJ C313, 1982 OJ C287, 1983 
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2. Recognises that this decentralised administration necessarily involves the 
payment of advances with subsequent verification that expenditure was in accordance 
with the regulations being administered, and that the Commission therefore has to 
clear the expenditure made in Member States; 
3. Stresses that the clearance of accounts is an inherent part of the Community's 
system of budgetary control which should not be devalued or treated as being of 
marginal interest; 
4. Believes that, although the amounts not approved for payment by the Commission 
are not large, the clearance of accounts is an essential and integral feature in 
ensuring that (a) the EAGGF is a common policy in all Member States and (b) due 
regard is had to the competence, regularity and efficiency of Member States' 
administration; 
5. Regards the extent of the delays which have built up, and which have amounted 
to four years or more, to be quite intolerable; 
6. Recognises that the Commission has introduced measures to reduce these 
delays, but notes that these have not Led, sofar,to any real or significant reduction 
in the average period of delay; 
7. Prefers that the backlog of accounts to be cleared is dealt with by normal 
procedures rather than any special and reduced procedure; 
8. Considers that the Commission should aim to clear accounts within the time-
table laid down; recognises that certain difficulties exist in meeting the present 
deadline but believes that this should not lead to delays greater than one year; 
9. Accepts provisionally the Commission assurances that progress is being made 
in reducing the backlog of accounts to be cleared, but resolves to review its 
acceptance of the Commission's approach to this problem in the spring of 1985 if 
by that time all accounts concerning the years up to and including 1982 have not 
been cleared finally; 
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10. Insists that the draft clearance decisions should be prepared on the basis of 
sound legal procedures and not by way of negotiated compromises and expects that 
these draft decisions shall, in future, be submitted to the European Parliament 
and to the Court of Auditors who shall react speedily to their content; 
11. Recognises that the Commission has made some detailed changes to its 
procedures as a result of the Court of Auditors' comments; reminds the Commission 
howeve~ that it has made only limited progress in dealing with the backlog of 
accounts to be cleared; asks it therefore to review its resistance to the remaining 
findings of the Court of Auditors' report and to continue the dialogue in a 
constructive fashion; 
12. Considers the suggestions made by the Court of Auditors in its response to 
the conclusions of the European Council of 18 June 1983 to be useful -
concerning the accrediting of payment agencies, the desirability that national 
agencies report to the Community directly, and the integration of control systems 
-and asks the Commission to report on the feasibility of their implementation; 
13. Points out that the discharge is a political decision and that amounts 
contested during the clearance procedure have hitherto been of the order of 
1-2% of EAGGF Guarantee section expenditure; furthermore, even it the timetable 
laid down is adhered to, it is not possible tor accounts to be cleared in time 
for the discharge decision on a given financial year; notes (a) that it is an 
unavoidable consequence of the decentralised system and (b) that this problem 
occurs elsewhere in the discharge procedure; 
14. Resolves in future to include in its consideration of the discharge 
an assessment of the progress towards clearance of EAGGF Guarantee section accounts 
for the year in question; 
15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the 
Court of Auditors and the Council of the EC. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. The preponderance of EAGGF Guarantee spending in the Community 
budget hardly needs to be spelt out in detail: it amounts to 
approximately two-thirds of the whole. The system of budgetary 
control runs as follows: 
the day-to-day operation of agricultural policy is in the hands 
of Member States, who receive from the Commission monthly advances 
of appropriations according to their estimate of what is needed; 
the Member States should forward to the Commission summaries of 
these financial operations for any given year (year n) in time 
for the Commission to include these figures in the revenue and 
expenditure account for 1 June of the following year (year n + 1); 
the Court of Auditors prepares its report on Community expenditure 
for the year in question in the months which follow, and this is 
published at the end of November (again, yearn+ 1); 
Parliament aims to give a discharge to the Commission by 30 April 
of the following year (i.e. yearn+ 2). 
2. Member States are supposed to forward details of agricultural 
expenditure for a given calendar (financial) year by the end of March, 
that is a few months later. This is intended to allow the Commission 
to include the figures in the 1 June revenue and expenditure account, 
and allow time for whatever clarifications and discussions are 
necessary before the deadline for the Commission to "clear" agricultural 
expenditure at the end of the year. Thus by 31 December of year n + 1 
the Commission should have made a definitive statement of what Member 
State expenditure has been accepted as eligible under the EAGGF, and 
what has been excluded. The EAGGF comprises of course an extremely 
complex series of instruments, and it is only realistic to administer 
it via Member State agencies. Given that the system operates by 
making advance payments to Member States, clearance of accounts is 
not merely a book-keeping exercise but is an integral part of managing 
the whole policy. 
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3. A new system of financing agricultural expenditure came into 
force at the beginning of 1971. At the time of the Court of 
Auditors' report (October 1982) agricultural expenditure during the 
first ten subsequent financial years should have been cleared. 
In fact, clearance decisions had only been taken for five of those 
years, affecting approximately 15 000 mEUA (that is 26Y.) of a 
total agricultural expenditure in those ten years of over 
58 000 mEUA. These clearance decisions occured as follows: 
Clearance foreseen Clearance decision 
for effected 
------------------ ------------------
1971 31.12.72 2.12.75 (amended 28.7.78 
and 30.10.79) 
1972 31.12.73 2.12.75 (amended 28.7.78 
and 30.10.79) 
1973 31.12.74 12.1 0. 79 
1974 31.12.75 16.11.81 
1975 31.12.76 16.11.81 (amended 7.11.83) 
Decisions subsequent to the Court's report have added firstly the following: 
1976 
1977 
31.12.77 
31.12.78 
14.1.83 
14.1.83 
These brought the amount cleared to 27 300 mECU out of a 1971-82 
total of 81 700 mECU, that is 33~. It is of course true that the 
accelerating pace of EAGGF expenditure tends to exaggerate a Little 
the amount uncleared compared with the number of years uncleared; 
nevertheless, these percentages represent a totally unsatisfactory 
situation. It should be noted that towards the end of 1982 - in 
its replies to the Court of Auditors Special Report - the Commission 
indicated that clearance decisions for 1976 and 1977 would be taken 
before the end of that year (actually taken in January 1983) and 
for 1978 and 1979 in "early 1983"; in fact, the decisions were 
taken as follows: 
1978 31.12.79 8.2.84 
1979 31.12.80 8.2.84 
- 9 
-
l'l 8f.6l1/fin. 
4. Clearance decisions are not even final when they are eventually 
taken. Some aspects of a Member State's expenditure may be 
provisionally refused, and although the amounts in question will be 
specified it is not always clear if or when refusal becomes permanent. 
In other cases, the Commission can indicate that enquiries are still 
in progress and might Lead to revision of the figures for certain 
sectors and certain countries. These uncertainties would be 
acceptable if the provisional clearance decision was followed by 
totally explicit statements as to what had been accepted, what had 
been refused, and what was still under discussion (and in this Latter 
case, the deadline for a decision). But this does not happen. 
5. In short, the Court of Auditors comment at the end of paragraph 2.7 
of its Special Report is a damning indictment of the system: 
"In sum, none of the financial years which has been the 
subject of a clearance decision since the entry into force 
of the financing system established by Regulation (EEC) 
No. 729/70 can be considered with certainty to have been 
finally cleared." 
6. As will become clear below, delays in the clearance procedure 
create a vicious circle and contribute to the unsatisfactory 
situation outlined above. For example, if the Community is so 
behind in clearing accounts that the Member States' own accounts 
have already been closed, then it is politically and/or Legally 
difficult for a Member State to make corrections. Member States 
therefore tend to contest the Commission's interpretations, even 
to the extent of bringing cases at the Court of Justice, and this 
delays matters even further. 
7. Needless to say, this situation has not gone unremarked and 
the Court of Auditors has commented on it regularly in its annual 
reports. The Commission has in reply defended the main features 
of the clearance system and - asking for additional staff - has 
since 1979 tried to cut into the backlog by taking two years together 
and using new auditing techniques. 
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8. How these intentions to do better in future have worked out in 
practice is indicated by the following table (derived from that in the 
Court of Auditors' report): 
Financial Date Delays Delays Delays Delays 
year foreseen (estimated <estimated (estimated (estimated 
for or actuaL) or actual) or actuaL) or actual) 
---------
c!~~!~DH _ir.)_12~Q __ _ir!_12~1_ __ _iQ_12§~-- _ir!_12§~---
1974 end 1975 5 yrs 6 
1975 11 1976 4 5 
1976 11 1977 4 5 5 
1977 11 1978 3 4 4 
1978 11 1979 3 4 4 4 
1979 11 1980 2 3 3 3 
1980 11 1981 <due but 3 
not 
planned) 
1981 11 1982 2 
1982 11 1983 
av. = 3.5 av. = 4.5 av. = 4.0 av. = 3.0 
This table would indicate that no really substantial progress has been made 
in reducing the backlog of decisions. The average delay in taking the 
clearance decision remains at around four years and will drop to three 
years only if the decisions for 1980 and 1981 are taken before the end 
of 1984. Even on the most optimistic forecasts, the system will not be 
running 'normally' - or rather, in accordance with the Regulation - much 
before the end of the decade. 
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It is clear that the system of clearing accounts is not working 9. 
as foreseen. The first question to ask is whether this matters, or if 
the problem is one of form rather than substance. The answer has to 
be that it is important, for the delays undermine the common nature 
of the CAP, the efforts to combat fraud, and the system of budgetary 
control in the Community. 
10. It has been an essential principle of the CAP since its 
inception that it be a policy applied in the same fashion in all 
Member States; irdeed this was a precondition for allowing free 
movement of agricultural products. Notwithstanding the continued 
existence of substantial national aids to agriculture, this communality 
remains essential. 
11. Inherent to the system of clearing EAGGF accounts is the concept 
of the Commission verifying that expenditure conforms to the common 
principles Laid down. The first requirement is that the Commission be 
informed as to what Member States have done in managing the EAGGF. 
But not only is information forwarded Late, it is often incomplete: 
" ..•.. certain Member States systematically refrain from 
providing reports from the national audit bodies on the paying 
agencies, or on the operations financed by the EAGGF Guarantee 
Section, and only submit descriptions of the national management 
and control systems as required by Art. 5 of Reg. (EEC) 1723/72, 
themselves summary to the point where it is impossible to tell 
what precautions have been taken in the Member States by 
individual measure to ensure proper disbursement of the 
Community expenditure." 
(Court of Auditors Special Report, para. 2.12Ca)) 
12. The greater the period that passes before the Commission can 
scrutinise closely Member States' expenditure, the greater the risk 
that alternative interpretations of any given regulation have grown 
up and become established; they are consequently more difficult to 
revise and to bring into Line with a common policy. Alternatively, 
some regulations of shorter duration may have expired before it 
becomes apparent that they have been differently applied. Indeed 
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national audits may have been already completed and this makes 
Member States even less willing or able to make corrections which 
have a retrospective financial impact. This partly explains 
Member States' readiness to challenge Commission interpretations, 
even to the point of going to the European Court of Justice. 
13. With the administration of the CAP shared by the Commission and 
the MembPr States, there has to be an !fficient rxchange of information 
if the policy is to be effectively managed. Commission officials on 
audit missions should be in a position not only to check on all 
aspects of management and control but also to get a good idea of what 
problems can arise in putting regulations into effect; prompt action 
can then lead to revision. Unfortunately, transmission of information 
is often Late and minimal in nature, and on-the-spot audits concentrate 
on reconciling accounts rather than analysis of management and control. 
In addition, the Lateness of the exercise makes any feedback out of 
date. 
14. This exchange of information should be useful to Member States 
also, helping them interpret regulations and administer smoothly the 
common policy. In fact, of course, clearance occurs Long after the 
expenditure has been incurred. Not only does this create problems as 
officials may have changed and files difficult to find, but - because 
the clearance exercise creates mainly problems for Member States - there 
has been a deterioration in the spirit of cooperation between Member 
States and the Commission. 
15. The opportunity is therefore missed to look at the quality of Member 
States' administrative and financial management and control; but this 
has to be of a high level if the regulations concerned are to be equally 
applied in all Member States. 
16. Similarly the Commission's distance from, and late realisation 
of, the problems of implementing regulations means that Loopholes and 
fraudulent practice risk going uncorrected for longer than necessary. 
Nor is the clearance exercise- as it is carried out - Likely to uncover 
fraud. The Court of Auditors (para. 2.13(b) of its Special Report) 
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criticises as inadequate the Commission's methods of audit, and 
typifies them as concentrating too much on the files of paying 
agencies and on reconciling accounts, and paying too little attention 
to management and control. 
17. It may be argued that the prime purpose is clearing the accounts 
and not the improvement of management and control in themselves. But 
not only do these have to be improved at every opportunity, the 
assumption of adequate management and control is inherent in any 
concept of clearance. 
18. The amounts concerned are not enormous in relation to the whole 
EAGGF budget. In 1971/2 for example, 47 mEUA was refused out of a 
total of 3 911 mEUA (that is, 1.20X>, in 1973 18 mEUA was refused 
out of a total of 3 659 mEUA C0.49X>, and in 1974/5 161 mEUA out of 
7 457 mEUA (2.16X>. Although these percentages are fairly limited, 
they are of course smaller than the proportion of expenditure called 
into question. 
19. In addition the sums are not negligible- an average of around 
80 mEUA in 1974 and 1975 - sums which would have supported a major 
Community effort in other fields such as, for example, energy or 
research. Moreover, as the Court of Auditors point out (para. 2.23 
of its Special Report),the effect of inflation during the years before 
clearance decisions are taken can reduce the amount to be recovered by 
80X. This is because the amounts are at nominal value and not 
updated. The loss in value is borne by the Community budget. 
It should be noted that the longer a Member State continues in 
ignorance to apply a regulation erroneously, because clearance is not 
prompt, the greater the financial impact of any correction. 
20. Any amounts recovered are entered in the budget as negative 
expenditure in the EAGGF section. As the amounts inevitably refer to 
earlier years, the normal budget principle of annuality can hardly be 
followed. In addition, the practice hitherto has been to include a 
single composite figure deriving from a mixture of unspecified 
corrections; this hardly assists budget clarity, and the Court of 
Auditors has suggested some improvements. 
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21. Even if the amounts affected are not thought to be Large, it 
has to be remembered that clearance is an essential feature of the 
Community's system of budgetary control. Although the payment of 
advances to Member States has given rise to numerous difficulties, 
it is clear that administration of the CAP can only be done on a 
decentralised basis. That inevitably implies an exercise to "clear" 
the accounts of the bodies responsible; although such an exercise 
cannot be avoided, it should be conducted effectively. 
22. It is clear that, in the near future at least, accounts will not 
. . . . sbouLd be given a be cleared 1n t1me for Parl1ament to dec1de on whether the CommlSSlon7 
discharge for any given year. The Court of Auditors considers that 
late clearance of accounts weakens the discharge considerably, and its 
views are quoted in the opening paragraph of this report. In short, 
it believes that the EAGGF accounts can only be book-keeping records 
of information sent in by Member States, that in these circumstances 
the Council resolution is affected by the ambiguous position of the 
Member States, and that Parliament grants a discharge in circumstances 
that deprive it of most of its significance. 
23. It is true of course that the amounts recovered are entered 
in Later budgets and that there is a discharge for these. But by 
this stage 8 or 9 years may have passed and - as the Court of Auditors 
have spelt out in some detail- it is sometimes impossible to trace 
decisions through all the stages of provisional clearance, provisional 
refusal with deadline and provisional refusal without deadline. This 
negates the relevance of this "second-stage" discharge for cleared 
accounts. On the other hand, even when the clearance is as fast as 
possible, the result inevitably appears in the accounts of a subsequent 
year and this separation reduces the political importance of clearance. 
24. It is also true that the discharge is given on accounts that 
are 98-99X complete and that the aim is to accept what the Commission 
has done in putting a given policy into effect rather than carry out 
an audit. Nevertheless, the Court of Auditors' judgment shout~ 
give Parliament cause for thought. 
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25. "The Parliament, by granting discharge to the Commission 
for its <i.e. the budget's) implementation, issues an 
opinion on information covering, for nearly three-quarters 
of the budget, financial operations for which the Commission 
has not yet assumed responsibility and which is therefore 
likely to be considerably amended at a later date. 
·~y exonerating the Commission from a responsibility which 
it has not yet really assumed, and by making its decision 
without being in possession of all the necessary information, 
the Parliament finds itself granting discharge in circumstances 
which deprive it of most of its significance. Discharge thus 
appears as a largely theoretical exercise, in that it relates 
to matters which are neither certain nor up to date. 
"Thus, by April 1982, the Parliament has, for the purposes 
of successive discharges, needed to examine the global 
management of some 58 000 million EUA since the introduction 
of the current system of financing the EAGGF Guarantee 
Section. At the same date, and for the same management 
period of 1971 to 1980, the Commission has only finally 
committed itself in respect of 15 000 million EUA. It has 
nonetheless requested discharge for the 58 000 million EUA." 
(OJ C 313, 1982, Special Report of the Court of Auditors 
concerning clearance of the accounts of the EAGGF GuarantPP. 
section, paragraphs 2.26(a) <iii) and 2.26 (b) respectively.) 
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IV. RECTIFICATION 
-------------
26. The Court of Auditors' Special Report spells out in detail why 
it believes the current system does not work well. On the one hand, 
a number of procedural problems are high lighted (built-in delays, 
memorandum intended to guide Member States in preparing their accounts 
but which is outdated, poor information from Member States, inadequate 
audit techniques and so on>. On the other hand, clearance decisions 
become based on retrospective interpretation of regulations; linked 
with this, Member States' right of reply has evolved into an 
unproductive negotiation procedure. 
27. The Commission, in reply, stresses the difficulties Member States 
have in meeting the deadlines set and the complexities both of the 
regulations concerned and of introducing new methods; it also places 
value on the dialogue with Member States. Nevertheless, although 
it contests some of the Court's views <e.g. on the role of the 
memorandum>, the Commission has accepted that certain improvements 
need to be made. The general tenor of the Commission's reply is, 
however, that the troubles that have severely hampered efforts to 
achieve clearance within reasonable deadlines are "teething troubles" 
<see para. I.7) and that the backlog is being rapidly reduced. 
28. Evidence so far would indicate that the Commission is over-
optimistic about its ability to shorten drastically the delays in 
the clearance decisions, and the Court of Auditors has accordingly 
suggested not only 
faster updating of the memorandum 
a rationalisation of visits and auditing 
a greater effort to clarify the interpretation 
of regulations sooner 
which are aimed at making the existing system work better, but also a 
number of more drastic changes. 
29. These more drastic measures comprise: 
(a) To make up the delay by temporary measures. Considering 
that experience shows that hopes of making up the delay 
using current methods have been constantly disappointed, 
the Court of Auditors suggests (para. 4.7 of its Special 
Report) that a fresh start might be made with a system 
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improved along the lines it suggests and that the financial 
years closed but not yet cleared be scrutinised only to check 
that the various accounts tally. 
The Commission rejected this proposal as this might prove 
harmful to Community financial arrangements, whilst acting 
in favour of those states whose files require investigation. 
As the Commission says, (para. 1.1 of its reply in the Special 
Report) 
"Experience has made it very clear that large amounts of 
expenditure are not properly handled and that there are 
significant differences of management between the Member 
States; very thorough Community auditing, at the time of 
clearance, must be regarded as indispensable." 
(b) In its report in response to the conclusions of the European 
Council of 18.6.83 (OJ C 287, 1983), the Court of Auditors 
discussed the defects of the decentralised management of the 
EAGGF and recommended three reforms: 
that paying agencies be accredited by the Commission, 
so as to enhance the consistency of application of common 
policies 
that paying agencies be accountable to the Commission 
directly and not via national treasuries 
that national and Community controls be integrated in a 
more economical and reliable system. 
- 18 - PE 87 .671/f in. 
